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Depreciation of Intangibles: An Area of
the Tax Law in Need of Change*t
Under the current tax law, depreciation of many purchased in-
tangibles is denied on the theory that they have an unlimited, or at
least indeterminate life. However, many taxpayers have chal-
lenged this theory on the ground that intangibles are subject to
wear and tear like any other asset. The imprecise factual nature
of this issue has lead to unnecessary complexity and uncertainty,
a great burden on the courts, and unfair treatment of taxpayers. A
legislative solution to these problems is needed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The depreciation of purchased intangible assets has been a troub-
lesome issue since the early days of federal income taxation. In May,
1993, the House of Representatives passed a bill that should, if en-
acted, eliminate much of the current controversy and complexity in
this area of the tax law by allowing depreciation of goodwill and
most other intangibles over a statutory life of fourteen years.' This
* The author wishes to dedicate this Comment to his wife, Robby, for her constant
support and to thank Professor Lester Snyder for his valuable comments and
recommendations.
t On August 10, 1993, shortly before publication of this Comment, President
Clinton signed into law H.R. 2264, which includes a provision allowing depreciation of
100 percent of the cost of purchased intangibles over a fifteen year period. The
information and analysis contained in this Comment is based on the law as it existed
prior to the enactment of H.R. 2264.
1. H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993). The provision allowing depreciation of
intangibles was introduced as part of H.R. 13, a tax simplification bill. See H.R. 13, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The intangibles provision of H.R. 13 was later added to H.R.
2264, the "Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993," which was passed by the
House of Representatives on May 27, 1993. On June 25, 1993, the Senate passed S.
1314, its version of H.R. 2264. Regarding the intangibles provision, S. 1314 is identical
to the House version of H.R. 2264, with two exceptions. First, under S. 1314, only 75%
of the cost of purchased intangibles would be depreciable over the 14 year statutory life.
Second, S. 1314 would allow a special 60-month amortization period for intangibles ac-
quired in the purchase of a computer software business.
The intangibles provision of H.R. 13 is identical to the provision included in H.R. 11, a
bill passed by both the House and the Senate in 1992, but vetoed by President Bush. See
discussion of H.R. 13 infra note 121. See also Bennett Minton, Rosty Reintroduces Sim-
plification Bill as Congress Gets Organized, 58 TAX NOTES 111, 111 (1993). In vetoing
H.R. 11, Bush criticized many of the bill's provisions. He did not, however, express any
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Comment will not only analyze the bill passed by the House, but will
also examine the problems arising under the current law and address
possible solutions to these problems.
In general, a taxpayer is allowed, under section 167 of the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code), to claim a depreciation deduction for "a
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a
reasonable allowance for obsolescence) of property used in the trade
or business."2 The regulations under section 167 indicate that no de-
preciation deduction is allowed for intangible assets that do not have
a limited life. Those regulations also specifically prohibit a deprecia-
tion deduction for goodwill.3 The Internal Revenue Service (the Ser-
vice) and the courts have adopted the position that a depreciation
deduction can be secured for intangible assets only if the taxpayer
establishes that the asset: "(1) has an ascertainable value separate
and distinct from goodwill, and (2) has a limited useful life, the du-
ration of which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy."4 As
this Comment will discuss in detail, these two requirements are nor-
mally the focal point of litigation involving the depreciation of
intangibles.
Much of the controversy surrounding the depreciation of in-
tangibles involves tax policy considerations. One of the standards
used to judge a system of income taxation from a policy standpoint
is fairness. In attempting to attain this goal of fairness, our tax sys-
tem relies on two propositions: (1) that taxation of people according
to their ability to pay is fair and (2) that income is a good measure
of ability to pay.
5
Fairness is generally divided into two categories, horizontal and
vertical equity.' The principle of horizontal equity, on which this
Comment will focus, means that fairness dictates that similarly situ-
ated people should be taxed alike.7 On the other hand, a tax law that
objections to the intangibles provision. Bennett Minton, Bush Vetoes Tax Bill on "The
Day After," 57 TAX NOTES 703, 703 (1992).
2. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988). All textual references to section numbers in this Com-
ment refer to the Internal Revenue Code.
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1986).
4. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974). See discussion of Houston Chronicle
infra note 60 and accompanying text. See also Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65; New-
ark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1683, (1993). See discussion
of Newark Morning Ledger Co. infra notes 46-47, 61-62 and accompanying text.
5. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 16 (8th ed. 1990). In
this context, "income" is an approximation of the accounting concept of net income (i.e.,
receipts less the cost of producing those receipts).
6. Id. at 19. Vertical equity refers to the concept that as one's income rises the
percentage of income that one pays as a tax should also rise. Id. at 20. This Comment
will not analyze vertical equity.
7. Id. at 19.
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treats similarly situated taxpayers differently, will probably be per-
ceived as unfair and will likely lead to increased taxpayer non-
compliance.8
The principle of horizontal equity is violated by the current tax
law's denial of depreciation deductions for purchased intangibles.
This inequity can be illustrated by comparing two hypothetical tax-
payers. The two taxpayers (A and B) each purchase a manufactur-
ing business for $10,000,000. Taxpayer A is able to allocate
$9,000,000 of the purchase price of the manufacturing business to
depreciable tangible assets (e.g., plant, machinery, and equipment)
according to their fair market value and $1,000,000 to nondeprecia-
ble intangibles (e.g., goodwill, and customer lists).9 Assume that
Taxpayer B purchases a similar, though slightly smaller, business
which has tangible assets with a fair market value of $7,000,000.
The remaining $3,000,000 of the purchase price of B's business is
allocated to nondepreciable intangibles. 10 Assume further that the
average useful life of the tangible assets is ten years for both taxpay-
ers. Therefore, A would be eligible for an annual depreciation de-
duction of $900,000 over the following ten years (assuming straight-
line depreciation). At an assumed marginal tax rate of forty percent,
the depreciation deductions would reduce A's annual tax bill by
$360,000.
B, on the other hand, faces a substantially less desirable tax situa-
tion. B would be allowed annual depreciation on tangible assets of
$700,000 which, at the same marginal tax rate of forty percent,
would result in a tax benefit of only $280,000. If we assume that
both A and B have identical taxable incomes before depreciation, we
8. George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1179, 1182-83 (1987).
9. Under I.R.C. § 1060 (1988) and Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(d) (1988),
the purchaser of a business must allocate the purchase price to tangible assets and cer-
tain specifically identifiable intangibles according to their relative fair market values.
Any remaining purchase price is allocated to "intangible assets in the nature of goodwill
and going concern value." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(d)(2)(iii).
10. For purposes of this example, assume the business purchased by B has a his-
tory of generating approximately the same annual net income as the business purchased
by A and that similar earnings are expected to continue in the future for each business.
As a result, a buyer is willing to pay $10,000,000 for either business, even though A's
business has a greater investment in tangible assets.
The difference between the total value of each business and the value of each business'
tangible assets is allocated to nondepreciable intangibles, as required by I.R.C. § 1060.
See supra note 9. See also infra note 34 for an example of how past earnings and pro-
jected future earnings are utilized in valuing a business.
can logically conclude that each has the same ability to pay.1 How-
ever, because of the nondepreciability of goodwill and other in-
tangibles in the nature of goodwill (e.g., customer lists and customer
structure), B's annual tax bill is $80,000 higher than A's. Over a
ten-year period, B would pay $800,000 more in income taxes than A
solely because B has a larger investment in nondepreciable
intangibles.
Although an extremely simplified example, the above comparison
illustrates how the current tax treatment of intangibles leads to ineq-.
uity in the treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. As a result of
the unfair treatment of purchasers of intangibles, the tax system has
been burdened with considerable controversy and litigation, which
leads to unnecessary complexity and inefficiency in the administra-
tion of the tax law.
12
After general discussions of depreciation and intangible assets,
this Comment will examine similar inequities created by the current
tax law in three areas: (1) tangible assets versus intangible assets,
(2) internally developed versus purchased intangibles, and (3) specif-
ically identifiable intangibles versus goodwill. This Comment will
then analyze additional justifications (other than correcting inequity)
for the depreciation of goodwill and other intangibles in the nature
of goodwill. Finally, this Comment will examine possible solutions to
these problems with a view toward significantly reducing the ineq-
uity and controversy arising under the current law.
II. BUSINESS EXPENDITURES AND DEPRECIATION, IN GENERAL
For income tax purposes, business expenditures can be classified as
either currently deductible or capital expenditures. Currently de-
ductible expenditures are those incurred by a taxpayer in a trade or
business that may be deducted on the current year's tax return. To
11. A basic assumption in this example is that the purchased intangibles are actu-
ally used up over ten years in the production of income for both taxpayers. Therefore,
depreciation of these intangibles over that period of time, if depreciation were allowed by
the tax law, would be appropriate. As this Comment will examine, however, estimation of
a useful life for some intangibles (particularly goodwill) is much more difficult than for
most tangible assets. The inequity in this situation is mitigated to some degree, though,
by the different treatment given to the costs of replacing tangible assets at the end of
their useful lives versus the costs of replacing intangibles. For example, the cost of buy-
ing a new machine to replace one that is worn out must be depreciated over the new
machine's useful life, while the cost of advertising to replace fading goodwill is generally
deductible immediately. The different treatment of tangible and intangible assets is ex-
amined in more detail infra Part IV.
12. Reducing controversy and litigation in this area was the principal basis for
including the intangibles provision in H.R. 11 and H.R. 13. See H.R. 11, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992); H.R. 13, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); H.R. REP. No. 631, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 210 (1992); S. REP. No. 300, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1992). See also supra
note 1 and infra note 125. The cases discussed infra Part IV provide examples of the
complex litigation arising under the current law.
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be currently deductible, an expenditure must be an "ordinary and
necessary expense[ ] paid or incurred during the taxable year in car-
rying on a trade or business."13
In general, a current deduction is not allowed for the cost of ac-
quisition of property (either tangible or intangible) "having a useful
life substantially beyond the taxable year."1 4 Capitalization may be
required, however, even though a specific asset is not acquired, if the
expenditure provides benefits to the taxpayer over a period beyond
the current taxable year.15 On the other hand, certain expenditures,
13. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (as amended in 1987). See also I.R.C. § 263A
(1988), which requires capitalization not only of direct costs of acquisition or construc-
tion of assets but also an allocable portion of related indirect costs.
Although decided before the enactment of § 263A in 1986, the case of Commissioner
v. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. 1 (1974), provides an example of the capitalization of indirect
costs required by § 263A. In Idaho Power, the taxpayer attempted to take a current
depreciation deduction on equipment that it used to construct its own facilities. The
Court denied the deductions and required the taxpayer to capitalize the depreciation as
part of the construction cost of the facilities along with direct costs, such as materials
and labor.
15. See, e.g., Fall River Gas Appliance Co. v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 515 (1st
Cir. 1965). The taxpayer was denied current deduction of costs to install leased gas ap-
pliances in customers' homes that would generate rental income over a period of future
years. The court required amortization of the expenditures over twelve years.
See also INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S.Ct. 1039 (1992), aff'g National
Starch and Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court re-
quired a target corporation to capitalize investment banking fees and other expenses paid
in connection with the acceptance of a friendly takeover bid because the Tax Court
found that the acquisition provided long-term benefits to the target corporation's existing
business. INDOPCO has the potential to significantly change the relationship between
deductions and capital expenditures.
Before INDOPCO, the courts relied on the test utilized in Commissioner v. Lincoln
Say. and Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971) in concluding that expenditures were deducti-
ble as long as a "separate and distinct asset" was not created. However, in INDOPCO,
the Court stated that Lincoln Savings does not stand for the proposition that "only ex-
penditures that create or enhance separate and distinct assets are to be capitalized under
section 263." 112 S.Ct. at 1044. The Court apparently held that costs that create some
significant future benefit must be capitalized. George B. Javaras & Todd F. Maynes,
Business Expansion and Protection in the Post-INDOPCO World, 55 TAx NOTES 971,
972 (1992).
The Court noted "the 'familiar rule' that 'an income tax deduction is a matter of
legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing the right to a claimed deduction
is on the taxpayer.'" INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1043 (quoting Interstate Transit Lines v.
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943)). The Court then concluded that "deductions
are exceptions to the norm of capitalization." Id. at 1043. This broad language has
caused concern among some taxpayers that the Service may challenge deductions for
advertising, employee training and repairs, and maintenance expenses, all of which often
provide both future and current benefits. John W. Lee, Doping Out the Capitalization
Rules After INDOPCO, 57 TAx NOTES 669, 669 (1992).
such as advertising and research and development, are currently de-
ductible even though they may provide benefits in future tax years.1
A taxpayer will generally seek to deduct the cost of acquiring or
constructing property by taking depreciation or amortization deduc-
tions over the property's estimated useful life or recovery period, as
allowed by sections 167 and 168.17 The estimated useful life of an
asset is defined in the regulations as "the period over which the asset
may reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade
or business.""' From an economic point of view, the purpose of tax
depreciation is to attempt to measure the annual decline in value of
the taxpayer's depreciable property that results from use in produc-
ing income for the taxpayer's business over the asset's useful life.19
Attempts to measure the annual economic decline in value of tan-
gible property, however, have largely been abandoned under the cur-
rent depreciation regime, the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS). 0 Under ACRS, which was adopted in 1981, the cost of
tangible property is recovered through depreciation deductions over
predetermined periods that are unrelated to, and generally shorter
than, the useful lives mandated under the previous depreciation sys-
tem.2' In an effort to simplify depreciation, Congress determined
In Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-39 I.R.B. 8, the Service held that INDOPCO "does not af-
fect the treatment of advertising costs as business expenses which are generally deducti-
ble under section 162." The Service has not yet taken an official position on the effect of
INDOPCO on the deductibility of business expansion costs, repairs and maintenance,
employee training costs, and other expenditures that potentially provide future benefits.
Service representatives, however, have stated that INDOPCO did not change the stan-
dards for distinguishing deductible expenses from capital expenditures, except to overrule
the "separate and distinct asset" doctrine. Lee, supra, at 670.
16. Advertising expenditures are generally deductible as "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses under I.R.C. § 162 (1988) on the ground that allocation between cur-
rent deductions and capital outlays is not feasible. For a discussion of the tax treatment
of advertising expenses, see BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS % 20.4.5 (1989 & Supp. 1992). I.R.C. § 174 (1988) allows current
deduction of research and experimental expenditures.
17. I.R.C. § 167 (1988) governs depreciation of tangible assets acquired before
January 1, 1981, and intangible assets. I.R.C. § 168 (1988) governs depreciation of tan-
gible assets acquired on or after January 1, 1981.
'The term "depreciation" can be used to refer to the deduction of the cost of all prop-
erty, both tangible and intangible, over its useful life. The term "amortization" is often
used to describe depreciation of intangible assets. This Comment will use the term "de-
preciation" for both tangible and intangible property.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1986).
19. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT'S
GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 6.08, at 142 (6th ed. 1991).
20. See further discussion of ACRS infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
21. EARL F. DAVIS & CAROLINE D. STROBEL, CAPITAL COST RECOVERY AND
LEASING § 1.10 (1987). The Asset Depreciation Range System (ADR) was used for
assets acquired from 1971-1980. ADR gave taxpayers more freedom to select useful lives
than under ACRS. ADR was intended to simplify depreciation but actually proved to be
quite complex because of detailed accounting requirements. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 395 (2d ed. 1988).
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that the new cost recovery system should deemphasize useful life,
which was an uncertain and subjective concept that often caused
lengthy and unproductive controversies between taxpayers and the
Service.2
One of the basic premises of the tax law is that income and deduc-
tions must be accounted for under a method that clearly reflects the
net income of the taxpayer for each tax year.23 By requiring the tax-
payer to defer depreciation deductions to future years, rather than
deducting the cost of assets in the year of acquisition or construction,
the tax law attempts to match deductions for the business use of
depreciable assets against the income those assets produce. The va-
lidity of the matching concept had been recognized by the courts.24
III. INTANGIBLE ASSETS, IN GENERAL
An ongoing business will generally use two broad categories of as-
sets in producing income - tangible assets and intangible assets. Tan-
gible assets are those that have a physical existence, such as cash,
real estate and equipment.2 Accounts receivable are also considered
tangible assets, although they do not appear to have a physical exis-
tence. 6 An intangible asset is "[a] nonphysical, noncurrent asset
which exists only in connection with something else, such as the
goodwill of a business."'27 Intangible assets can also be described as
"[a]ll competitive advantages, developed or acquired, having a value
derived principally from use in the taxpayer's trade or business,
which enable the taxpayer to generate revenue and earn income in
excess of the revenue and income attributable specifically to tangible
assets."'2 8 In addition to the goodwill of a business, other examples of
22. DAVIs & STROBEL, supra note 21, §§ 1.09-1.10.
23. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 446(b) (1988); CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 215;
GRAETZ, supra note 21, at 853.
24. See, e.g., Massey Motors v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 106 (1960). To more
clearly reflect the taxpayer's net income for the taxable years involved, the court required
the taxpayer to recompute depreciation on vehicles used in the business by subtracting
salvage value from the cost of the vehicles, resulting in a more accurate estimate of the
assets' annual decline in value. Id. at 107. See also Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir. 1965). The taxpayer was denied a deduction for
employee training costs incurred before the taxpayer had begun business because such
costs would generate income in future years. Id.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (6th ed. 1990).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 808-09.
28. Martin J. Gregorcich, Amortization of Intangibles: A Reassessment of the
Tax Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 28 TAx LAW. 251, 258 (1975).
intangible assets are patents, copyrights, 29 and customer lists.
A business' intangible assets can be obtained through internal de-
velopment or by purchasing the intangible assets of another business.
A business may internally develop intangible assets in a variety of
ways, such as advertising, research and development,3 0 establishing a
marketing structure, and developing a capable management and la-
bor force.31 Purchased intangibles are normally acquired when a tax-
payer buys the assets of an ongoing business and pays more than the
fair market value of the acquired business' tangible assets. The tax-
payer must allocate this excess purchase price among the various in-
tangibles acquired.32 These intangibles generally consist of two types:
(1) specifically identifiable intangibles, such as patents, copyrights,
contracts, and covenants not to compete, and (2) goodwill (which
often includes intangibles related to goodwill, such as customer lists
or customer structure), which is the residual remaining after alloca-
tion to all tangible assets and specifically identifiable intangible
assets.33
Although section 1060 requires that the value of goodwill be de-
termined by the residual method, conceptually, goodwill is the pre-
sent value of the projected future excess earnings of the purchased
business.34 The parties involved in the purchase and sale of a busi-
ness frequently find computations of earning potential useful in their
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1986) states that patents and copy-
rights are depreciable because they have limited useful lives. See infra notes 51-59 and
accompanying text for a discussion of depreciation of certain specifically identifiable
intangibles.
30. See discussion of research and experimental expenditures infra note 83.
31. Gregorcich, supra note 28, at 256.
32. I.R.C. § 1060(a) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(d) (1988).
33. Gregorcich, supra note 28, at 258-64. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the different conceptual notions of goodwill.
34. GLENN A. WELSCH ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 519 (5th ed. 1979).
The excess earnings approach is illustrated in the following example, which is adapted
from the materials in WELSCH, ET AL., at 521-22:
Assume the following facts:
1. Taxpayer A purchases the net assets* of an ongoing business. The net assets
have a fair market value of $10,000,000.
2. The normal expected rate of return on investment in the industry is 12%.
3. Based on the previous ten years' actual earnings, Taxpayer A projects that
the purchased business will have annual earnings of $2,000,000 for the next
ten years.
4. Any projected earnings in excess of the normal industry rate of return are
discounted to present value at an annual rate of 15% (15% is used rather
than 12% to reflect the greater risk of not earning above the normal rate).
* Net assets includes all purchased tangible assets and specifically identified
intangibles, (e.g., patents and copyrights), less liabilities assumed by Tax-
payer A.
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negotiations. 5 Additionally, two other approaches to goodwill are
customer structure and going concern value. These approaches, how-
ever, are primarily definitional in nature and are not useful in deter-
mining a value for goodwill.36
IV. INEQUITIES IN THE CURRENT TAX LAW
A. Intangible Versus Tangible Assets
As indicated above, a taxpayer may take depreciation deductions
under section 167 for assets which have a limited useful life that can
be estimated with reasonable accuracy. In other words, an asset is
depreciable if it wears out over a reasonably estimable period of
time, as would clearly be true for a building or a piece of equip-
ment.3" Reasonable accuracy is all that is required in estimating an
asset's useful life. 8 The Code presumes that all tangible assets are
subject to wear and tear that will use up their value to the taxpayer
over some period of time.39 In fact, under ACRS, which governs de-
preciation of tangible property placed into service after 1980, a tax-
payer is not required to make a reasonably accurate estimate of the
useful life of tangible assets to obtain a depreciation deduction. In-
stead, ACRS assigns a useful life to tangible assets based on the
type of property acquired." For example, the cost of nonresidential
real property must be depreciated over a recovery period of 31.5
Projected future average annual earnings of
the purchased business $2,000,000
Expected annual return on net assets at
normal rate of return for the industry
($10,000,000 x 12%) 1,200,000
Projected annual excess earnings $ 800,000
Annual excess earnings (computed above) $ 800,000
Projected period of excess earnings 10 years
Value of Goodwill (i.e. present value of
projected excess earnings for ten years at 15%
capitalization rate) $4,015,015
35. Id. at 520.
36. J. Bruce Donaldson, Goodwill and Other Intangibles in Business Acquisitions,
31 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 291, 294-96 (1973). See also infra notes 70-79 and accompany-
ing text for further discussion of the conceptual approaches to goodwill.
37. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, 6.08, at 137.
38. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F. 2d 1240,
1253-54 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974), where the court stated,
"Extreme exactitude in ascertaining the duration of an asset is a paradigm that the law
does not demand."
39. BITTKER, supra note 16, T 23.2.6, at 23-35 to 23-36.
40. I.R.C. § 168(c) (1988). Under ACRS, the term "recovery period" replaces the
years, regardless of its estimated useful life.41
While the Code allows depreciation for all tangible assets used in
a trade or business under the presumption that the value of all such
assets will be used up over time, the same cannot be said for intangi-
ble assets. Depreciation deductions for intangible assets are much
more difficult for a taxpayer to obtain. In fact, ACRS does not apply
to intangible property.42 A taxpayer, therefore, must find authority
for depreciation of intangibles in section 167 .48 The regulations pre-
scribe that an intangible asset may be depreciated only if it is useful
in a taxpayer's business for "a limited period, the length of which
can be estimated with reasonable accuracy . . . [e]xamples are pat-
ents and copyrights. 44 To depreciate an intangible asset, the tax-
payer has the burden of proving that the asset has a limited useful
life that can be measured with reasonable accuracy, as well as prov-
ing that the asset has an "ascertainable value separate and distinct
from goodwill."
46
The rationale used by the courts for denying depreciation is that
intangibles in the nature of goodwill and goodwill itself are not wast-
ing assets.46 The economic value of such intangibles is assumed by
the courts to be relatively permanent.47 Given the traditional aim of
concept of useful life. The taxpayer no longer estimates a useful life for depreciable as-
sets. Rather, each asset is classified in one of eight recovery classes with recovery periods
ranging from 3 to 50 years. Id. § 168(c)(1). See also I.R.C. § 168(e) (1988). In addi-
tion, the term "cost recovery" is often used to describe depreciation under ACRS.
41. I.R.C. § 168(c)(1) (1988).
42. I.R.C. § 168(a) (1988). Section 168 applies specifically to tangible property.
43. BITTKER, supra note 16, 23.2.6, at 23-35.
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1986).
45. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1251 (5th
cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65; see
also Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1683 (1983).
46. See, e.g, Richard Miller and Sons v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 452 (Ct. Cl.
1976). In deciding whether insurance expirations purchased by the taxpayer from a com-
petitor insurance agency were depreciable, the court stated "[t]he most important crite-
rion is whether in fact it is a wasting asset". See also Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
United States, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993). The sub-
scriber lists acquired by the taxpayer in the purchase of a newspaper were not considered
wasting assets by the Court of Appeals because customers leaving the newspaper who
were included in the purchased subscriber lists were continually replaced by new custom-
ers who were attracted by the quality and reputation (i.e., goodwill) of the newspaper. In
reversing, however, the Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals' position and held
that the cost of the purchased subscribers was depreciable. Newark Morning Ledger Co.,
113 S. Ct. at 1681. See further discussion infra note 47.
47. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1248 ("[T]he economic value of a
taxpayer's continuing goodwill within his field of operations is seen as an ongoing asset
that fluctuates but does not necessarily diminish."). But see Newark Morning Ledger
Co., 113 S. Ct at 1679-80. While the Court in Newark did not state that goodwill itself
is depreciable, it did hold that certain intangibles that are closely related to goodwill may
be depreciable. The Court also held that whether customer-based intangibles, such as
purchased newspaper subscribers, can be separated from goodwill and depreciated is a
question of fact. Id. See further discussion of depreciation of goodwill-related intangibles
infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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tax depreciation to measure the annual decline in value of assets
used in the taxpayer's business,48 courts will likely deny depreciation
deductions for any asset that is presumed not to diminish in value
over time.
49
If the presumption of an unlimited life for such intangibles is in-
correct, however, an inequitable distinction is created if the law al-
lows depreciation of tangible assets while denying depreciation of
intangibles. The purpose of the succeeding sections of this Comment
is to show that intangibles in the nature of goodwill do diminish in
value over time and should, therefore, be depreciable for tax
purposes.
B. Specifically Identifiable Intangibles Versus Goodwill and
Other Intangibles in the Nature of Goodwill
An inequity similar to the one just described results from the will-
ingness of the tax law to allow depreciation of certain specifically
identifiable intangibles while denying depreciation of goodwill and
certain other intangibles, such as customer lists and customer struc-
ture. When a taxpayer purchases the assets of an ongoing business,
he must allocate the purchase price among tangible assets, specifi-
cally identified intangibles, and goodwill.50 Certain specifically iden-
tifiable intangibles have a useful life that generally is relatively easy
to identify. Without question, depreciation is available when an in-
tangible can be readily shown to have a limited useful life, such as a
patent or copyright.5' For example, a patent may be depreciated over
its seventeen year federally protected life as long as the patent
holder uses it in his trade or business or for the production of in-
come.52 Another typical example of a depreciable intangible is a con-
tract right acquired by the purchaser of a business (e.g., a contract
to provide services for a customer or a building lease with favorable
terms). If the life of the contract covers a specific period of time, the
contract right can be depreciated over that period. 3
48. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, 6.08, at 142.
49. The Code, however, has abandoned, to some degree, attempts to measure the
annual decline in value of tangible and intangible assets in favor of a cost recovery ap-
proach. See discussion of ACRS supra notes 20-22 and 40-41 and accompanying text
and start-up and organizational expenditures infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
50. I.R.C. § 1060(a) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(d) (1988).
51. Richard Miller and Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 452 (Ct. Cl.
1976).
52. Gregorcich, supra note 28, at 259.
53. Id. at 261. If, however, acquired customer relationships are terminable at will
One of the most common specifically identified intangibles arising
out of the purchase and sale of a business is a covenant not to com-
pete. A purchaser paying a premium for goodwill in the acquisition
of an ongoing business will typically demand a covenant not to com-
pete from the seller so that he can be assured of obtaining the bene-
fits of that goodwill. 4 Courts have generally allowed taxpayers to
allocate part of the purchase price of a business to an amortizable
noncompete covenant if the parties to the purchase and sale agreed
upon the amount allocated and the allocation reflected economic re-
ality.5 In determining the outcome of cases, the courts have ex-
amined the following factors:56 tax polarity, 57 intent and ability to
compete,58 and negotiations between the parties.59
In acquiring the assets of an ongoing business, the taxpayer may
acquire intangible assets that are separately identifiable, but do not
have such readily ascertainable useful lives as patents, contracts, or
covenants not to compete. Taxpayers have consistently attempted to
depreciate customer lists or similar assets that are acquired in the
purchase of an ongoing business on the theory that customers' pa-
tronage will continue for a limited period of time. Before the Hous-
ton Chronicle decision in 1973, courts generally held that such
by customers, depreciation of the intangible asset (sometimes referred to as customer
structure) is often denied by the courts. See, e.g., Golden State Towel and Linen Serv.,
Ltd. v. United States, 373 F.2d 938, 944 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The court disallowed a deduc-
tion for the loss of a customer that was included in a customer list acquired as part of the
purchase of a going business. The court stated that "a purchased terminable-at-will type
of customer list is an indivisible business property with an indefinite, nondepreciable life,
indistinguishable from - and the principal element of - goodwill." But see Newark Morn-
ing Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993) (discussed supra notes 46-47
and infra notes 61-62).
54. Gregorcich, supra note 28, at 264.
55. Darlene A. Smith, Patrick Hennessee & Clifford Hutton, Allocating Purchase
Price to Assets Regains Importance, 19 TAX'N FOR LAw. 358, 359 (1991). The amount
allocated to the covenant is amortized over the period covered by the agreement, typi-
cally five years or less.
.56. Id. at 360-61.
57. See, e.g., Douglas J. Lemery v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367, 376 (1969), aff'd,
451 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1971). The court disallowed amortization of the amount of the
purchase price allocated by the purchaser to a noncompete covenant. Significant to the
court was the lack of tax polarity between buyer and seller, which could lead to manipu-
lation of the purchase price allocation to the advantage of both parties. For further dis-
cussion of the adverse tax interests of buyer and seller, see infra note 117 and
accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1961). The court
relied on certain factors in determining that the "purported covenant was in reality a sale
of goodwill." Among those factors were that the seller did not wish to compete with the
buyers and the seller's lack of technical background and sales contacts.
59. See, e.g., Annabelle Candy Co. v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962),
reh'g denied. The purchaser allocated an amount to a covenant not to compete given by
the seller. The court found that the covenant was not separately bargained for or paid for
and thus was not amortizable. Of significant importance to the court was the fact that
the covenant was not discussed by the parties until after the purchase price had been
preliminarily agreed upon.
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intangibles were nondepreciable as a matter of law under the "mass
asset rule." 60 In many cases, taxpayers have undertaken complex
statistical studies based on historical, demographic, and other data in
attempting to prove the limited life of the asset. Because of the inex-
act factual nature of estimating the life of a customer list or similar
asset and proving a value separate and distinct from goodwill, tax-
payers' attempts to depreciate such assets are routinely challenged
by the Service, often leading to time-consuming and costly
litigation.61
60. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1249 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974). The court's holding, which was accepted
by the Service in Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65, essentially superseded the "mass
asset rule," which provided that all purchased intangibles in the nature of goodwill (e.g.,
goodwill, going concern value, customer lists, and trained labor force) are grouped to-
gether and treated as a single indivisible asset. The individual intangibles were presumed
to have self-regenerating capability and therefore no determinable useful life.
In Houston Chronicle, the court allowed the taxpayer to depreciate over five years a
newspaper subscription list purchased from a defunct competitor because the taxpayer
showed that the list had a value separate and distinct from its competitor's goodwill
(because the taxpayer had no intention of continuing to publish the competitor's newspa-
per) and a limited useful life that could be estimated with reasonable accuracy. The
court held that newspaper subscription lists were not nondepreciable as a matter of law.
For cases endorsing the mass asset rule, see, e.g., Golden State Towel and Linen Serv.,
Ltd. v. United States, 373 F.2d 938, 942 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("[G]oodwill and customer lists
...are but one in contemplation of law."); Metropolitan Laundry Co. v. United States,
100 F.Supp. 803, 805 (N.D. Cal. 1951) ("The gradual replacement of old patrons with
new ones is not to be regarded as the exchange of old capital assets for new and different
ones, but rather as the process of keeping a continually existing capital asset intact.").
61. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir.
1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993). The taxpayer attempted to depreciate the portion
of the purchase price of a newspaper business allocated to an intangible denominated
"paid subscribers," which represented the taxpayer's estimate of the future profits to be
derived from the at-will subscribers acquired. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals essen-
tially held that certain intangible assets, such as customer-based intangibles, are nonde-
preciable because they are inseparable from goodwill. The court stated that "[c]ustomer
lists are generally not depreciable when acquired in conjunction with sale of. . .a going
concern." Id. at 568. The Third Circuit's decision conflicts with cases in other circuits,
including Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987) and Colorado
Nat'l Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. 771, (1990), affid, 984 F.2d 383
(10th Cir. 1993), in which taxpayers were allowed to depreciate customer-based in-
tangibles after proving that the assets have value apart from goodwill and reasonably
ascertainable useful lives (see discussion of Colorado Nat'l Bankshares infra and Donrey
infra note 63). The Supreme Court resolved this conflict by holding in Newark Morning
Ledger that customer-based intangibles are not nondepreciable as a matter of law.
In Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, the court sustained the taxpayer's depreciation deduc-
tions for core deposits intangible acquired in the purchase of several banks (core deposits
intangible represents the present value of the future stream of net income projected to be
generated by utilizing the core deposits acquired on the date a bank is purchased). The
taxpayer used sophisticated studies to estimate how long depositors would maintain their
accounts at each bank. Based on these studies, the taxpayer was able to show that core
In Newark Morning Ledger, although the Supreme Court held
that customer-based intangibles are not nondepreciable as a matter
of law, the Court also held that the taxpayer must meet a "substan-
tial burden of proving" that the asset has an "ascertainable value
and a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained
with reasonable accuracy." 2 Before the Supreme Court's decision in
Newark Morning Ledger, however, some courts had denied deduc-
tions based on the theory that customer-based intangibles are indis-
tinguishable from goodwill, even though the taxpayer could ascertain
a value for the asset and estimate a useful life with reasonable
accuracy.
63
Since Houston Chronicle, the outcome of most cases concerning
the depreciation of customer-based intangibles has been determined
largely by the sophistication of the taxpayer's proof.64 As a result, an
increasing number of taxpayers will benefit from spending the neces-
sary money to develop the level of proof needed to sustain a deduc-
tion. This trend will likely engender an ever-increasing amount of
controversy and litigation in this area of the tax law.65
While taxpayers have been successful in some cases in securing
depreciation deductions for certain customer-based intangibles, the
courts have routinely denied depreciation of goodwill itself as a mat-
ter of law. 6 Depreciation of goodwill is specifically denied by the
regulations under section 167.67 Under the tax law, goodwill is the
deposits intangibles had ascertainable value separate and distinct from goodwill and use-
ful lives which could be estimated with reasonable accuracy.
62. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1683. For examples of other cases
before Newark in which depreciation of customer-based intangibles was allowed, see
Panichi v. United States, 834 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1987) (taxpayer bought only a small
part of the customer list of an ongoing business and the seller remained in business);
Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d 1240 (taxpayer bought the subscriber list of a defunct
competitor with no intention of continuing to publish the competitor's newspaper);
Donrey, 809 F.2d 534 (court sustained the taxpayer's depreciation deductions for a list of
terminable-at-will subscribers acquired in the purchase of an ongoing newspaper busi-
ness); Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771 (discussed supra note 61).
63. See, e.g., Southern Bancorp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.
1988); AmSouth Bancorp. and Subsidiaries v. United States, 681 F.Supp. 698 (N.D.
Ala. 1988). In both cases, the taxpayer failed to meet its burden of proof that the ac-
quired deposit base had a value separate and distinct from goodwill. See also Golden
State Towel and Linen Serv., 373 F.2d 938; Metropolitan Laundry, 100 F.Supp. 803;
Newark Morning Ledger, 945 F.2d 555. In Newark, the Court of Appeals concluded: "In
any case, consistent with the prevailing case law, we believe that the Service is correct in
asserting that, for tax purposes, there are some intangible assets which, notwithstanding
that they have wasting lives that can be estimated with reasonable accuracy and ascer-
tainable values, are nonetheless goodwill and nondepreciable." 945 F.2d at 568.
64. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Report on Proposed Legislation
on Amortization of Intangibles (H.R. 3035), 53 TAx NOTES 943, 946 (1991). See also
Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1678 ("The courts that have found these assets
depreciable have based their conclusions on carefully developed factual records.").
65. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 64, at 946.
66. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1986).
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residual remaining after the purchase price of a business is allocated
to all tangible and separately identifiable intangible assets based on
their relative fair market values. 8 The regulations, though, do not
define goodwill.69
Despite the lack of a definition in the regulations, three separate
conceptual approaches have been utilized to define goodwill: (1) cus-
tomer structure, (2) going concern value and (3) extraordinary earn-
ing power.7 0 In terms of customer structure, goodwill has been
repeatedly defined in the courts as "the expectancy that old custom-
ers will resort to the old place,"7 1 and "the expectancy of continued
patronage for whatever reason.
'7 2
Going concern value, which results from the use of assets in an
ongoing business, is similar to, but is also different from, goodwill.
Goodwill is related to above average profitability. Going concern
value, however, can exist in a business with only average profitability
because this concept is based on the premise that an ongoing busi-
ness with average profits is more valuable than the sum of the fair
market values of the individual assets, if separated from the busi-
ness.7 3 Going concern value is rarely valued separately. Indeed, going
concern value is usually treated as an integral part of goodwill.
74
In contrast to customer structure and going concern value, which
68. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-lT(d)(2)(iii) (1988), which states that the
residual is composed of "intangible assets in the nature of goodwill and going concern
value."
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1986).
70. Donaldson, supra note 36, at 294-95.
71. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 559 (3d Cir.
1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993) (quoting Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852,
855 (5th Cir. 1963)).
72. Id. at 559 (quoting Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962)).
73. WELSCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 520 n.4.
74. Id. But see Concord Control, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1345,
1356 (1976), affid, 615 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1980). The court required the taxpayer to
allocate a portion of the purchase price of a business to nondepreciable going concern
value because it found that the taxpayer acquired "an ongoing business that was earning
money, had a trained staff of employees, had a product line presently ready for sale and
equipment ready for immediate use." Although the court found that the acquired busi-
ness had excess earning capacity, it found that the business did not possess goodwill. The
court stated that excess earning capacity was not enough in and of itself to demonstrate
the existence of goodwill. The expectancy of continued patronage or continuing competi-
tive advantage is also a necessary requirement. The court found this latter element of
goodwill lacking because the company was engaged in an industry with a great degree of
competition and little customer loyalty and it manufactured a product line that was "vir-
tually identical to those of its competitors." Although the Sixth Circuit affirmed the basic
holding below, the case was remanded to the Tax Court for an explanation of the method
used to calculate going concern value. See Concord Control, Inc. v. Commissioner 78
T.C. 742 (1982).
are mere conceptual notions, in practice, goodwill has often been
quantitatively measured by excess earning power.76 Under this
method, the parties negotiating the sale of a business determine a
value for goodwill by capitalizing the projected earnings of a busi-
ness in excess of a normal rate of return on the tangible and specifi-
cally identifiable intangible assets of the business. With this
approach, the value of goodwill diminishes over time because excess
earnings are projected over a finite period and cannot reasonably be
expected to continue indefinitely.
70
Despite the limited expected life of goodwill under the capitaliza-
tion of excess earnings approach, the courts have consistently found
that goodwill is nondepreciable as a matter of law under the theory
that goodwill does not have a limited life and, therefore, does not
decline in value over time.7 7  One court stated, "goodwill in any
practical sense, has no terminable life; but rather continues in exis-
tence just so long as the business continues ... -78 If goodwill re-
tains its value indefinitely, it should be nondepreciable because the
purpose of depreciation is to measure the decline in value of an asset
over time70
The theory that goodwill has an unlimited life, although well es-
tablished in the courts, has not gone unquestioned. As one commen-
tator points out, the goodwill of a business that exists at a given
75. Note, Amortization of Intangibles: An Examination of the Tax Treatment of
Purchased Goodwill, 81 HARV. L. REv., 859, 860-61 (1968). One theory suggests that
the capitalization of excess earnings method is conceptually sound because it allows the
use of a higher rate of return to discount the excess earnings stream than the rate used to
discount normal earnings. The higher rate is used to account for the greater risk of not
earning above the normal rate of return. See WELSCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 521-22.
See also supra note 34 for an example of the calculation of goodwill under the capitali-
zation of earnings approach.
76. Walter C. Frank, Goodwill is not Immortal: A Proposal to Deduct the Ex-
haustion of Purchased Goodwill, 23 J. TAx'N 380, 381 (1965). The author recommends
writing off goodwill over the period of projected excess earnings. For example, if the
value of goodwill was established by the purchase of excess earnings over five years, the
author recommends depreciating goodwill over that five year period. Id.
77. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240,
1247 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974) ("Some intangible capital as-
sets are, of course, non-amortizable as a matter of law, with the most frequently litigated
example being the 'goodwill' of an ongoing business.").
The court held, however, that other intangibles related to goodwill (e.g., newspaper
subscriber lists) are not nondepreciable as a matter of law. The taxpayer has the burden
of proving that the asset has "an ascertainable value separate and distinct from goodwill"
and a limited useful life that can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. Id. at 1250. See
also Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993) (discussed
supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text).
78. Dodge Bros., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 1941). The
taxpayer attempted to depreciate the value allocated to its rights to the design of a spe-
cific model of car acquired in the purchase of the Dodge Brothers business. The Court
denied depreciation on the ground that the design of the car was inseparable from pur-
chased goodwill. Id. at 100-02.
79. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, % 6.08, at 142.
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point in time results much more from the recent activities of the
business than from a continuation of goodwill that was in existence
at some time in the company's history. Therefore, without continual
efforts to create new goodwill, a business will soon find that whatever
goodwill (i.e., the ability to generate excess earnings) it once had has
disappeared. 80
Although excess earnings can be projected to continue for a cer-
tain number of years, the conditions which give rise to the excess
earnings cannot be assumed to be permanent.81 A change in man-
agement, improvements in competitors' products, and changes in
technology are just a few examples of the unlimited number of inter-
nal and external factors that can cause the erosion of the potential
for excess earnings.82 This erosion results in the decline in value of
the taxpayer's purchased goodwill, which should be the basis for a
depreciation deduction.
C. Purchased Intangibles Versus Internally Developed
Intangibles
In general, a business generating excess earnings has obtained
goodwill by one or both of two methods: creation of goodwill inter-
nally or acquisition of goodwill in the purchase of an ongoing busi-
ness. Most expenditures that a business incurs in creating goodwill
internally are deductible immediately. Examples include training
employees and advertising (deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses under section 162) and research and development
costs (section 174).83 These goodwill-creating expenditures are de-
ductible in the year incurred even though their purpose is to contrib-
ute to the production of revenue in future years, as well as the
current year.
80. Frank, supra note 76, at 381.
81. Frank, supra note 76, at 380.
82. Id.
83. Gregorcich, supra note 28, at 256. Note that I.R.C. § 174 (1988) was enacted
to eliminate uncertainty and to encourage taxpayers to engage in research and experi-
mentation. BITTKER, supra note 16, 26.3.1, at 26-22. Section 174 allows taxpayers to
elect either current deduction of research and experimental expenditures or capitalization
and amortization over not less than 60 months. Before § 174, uncertainty existed con-
cerning whether research and experimental expenditures were entitled to current deduc-
tion or required to be capitalized because they provided long-term benefits. Additionally,
when capitalization was required, amortization was allowed only if a limited useful life
could be shown for the benefits derived. BITrKER, supra note 16, 26.3.1, at 26-22 to 26-
23.
In contrast, the purchaser of an ongoing business is denied depre-
ciation deductions for acquired goodwill. As a result of this inconsis-
tency, two similarly situated taxpayers are treated differently by the
law.84 The developer of goodwill is allowed to immediately deduct
goodwill-creating expenditures while also deferring to future years
the recognition of revenue generated by these expenditures. The pur-
chaser of an ongoing, profitable business, however, normally will ex-
pect revenue to be generated by the purchased goodwill immediately
after purchase. As a consequence, in addition to being denied depre-
ciation deductions for purchased goodwill, in many cases the pur-
chaser must recognize revenue for tax purposes sooner than the
developer of goodwill, whose expenditures may not yield significant
revenues for several years. This is particularly true in the case of a
new company that is not yet well-established. 85 This discrimination
in favor of the developer is partially alleviated by allowing the pur-
chaser current deductions for expenditures, such as advertising and
research and development, that are intended to replace eroding pur-
chased goodwill.8 6
V. ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DEPRECIATION OF
GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLES IN THE NATURE OF
GOODWILL
This section of the Comment proposes additional arguments in
favor of allowing tax depreciation of goodwill by comparison to the
financial accounting treatment of goodwill, as well as by comparison
84. The similar situations of these two types of taxpayers can be illustrated by a
hypothetical comparison. Assume the following facts:
1. Both A and B own identical businesses possessing goodwill with a value of
$5,000,000.
2. A's goodwill was created by spending $1,000,000 in each of the first five
years of the company's existence on goodwill-creating expenditures (e.g., adver-
tising, research and development, and training a labor force).
3. B purchased an ongoing business and allocated $5,000,000 of the purchase
price to goodwill according to § 1060.
The situations of A and B are very similar. Both A and B possess $5,000,000 of goodwill
in identical businesses. A, however, created goodwill with $5,000,000 of tax-deductible
expenditures while B purchased goodwill with a $5,000,000 nondeductible expenditure.
Although both taxpayers theoretically possess the same excess earning power, the cost to
A of creating goodwill is substantially less than B's cost to purchase it because of the
different tax treatment of the two taxpayers.
One notable difference between A and B is that A's annual expenditures of $1,000,000
are of a recurring nature, which is normally associated with immediate deductibility. In
contrast, B's expenditure is a lump-sum payment for long-term future benefits, which is a
typical characteristic of a capital expenditure. Therefore, requiring B to capitalize the
$5,000,000 paid for goodwill is proper. This difference, though, does not justify the ineq-
uity between A and B that results from the denial of depreciation of purchased goodwill.
85. Comment, Depreciability of Going Concern Value, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 484,
493 (1973).
86. Id. at 493-94.
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to the amortization of start-up and organizational expenditures
under sections 195 and 248, respectively. First, however, an exami-
nation will be made of the effect of nondepreciability on the availa-
bility and timing of deductions for goodwill and, in turn, the effect
on the purchaser's cash flow.
A. Effect of Nondepreciability of Goodwill on the Availability
and Timing of Deductions and the Buyer's Cash Flow
Because goodwill cannot be depreciated for tax purposes, the pur-
chaser of an ongoing business is not allowed any deductions for the
erosion of purchased goodwill while operating his business. Although
goodwill is not depreciable, the taxpayer may still obtain a deduction
when he sells the business because goodwill retains its original ba-
sis.817 This basis is then subtracted from the selling price allocated to
goodwill, thereby reducing the capital gain or increasing the capital
loss to the taxpayer.88 If the taxpayer never sells the business, how-
ever, he will never recover the cost of the purchased goodwill.89
A taxpayer buying a profitable business will always prefer annual
depreciation deductions over a deductible loss or reduction in taxable
gain on the sale of the business. This is so because depreciation de-
ductions enable the taxpayer to reduce his tax bill each year as he
operates the acquired business. In contrast, a deductible loss or a
reduction in taxable gain is only beneficial when the business is sold,
which may not occur until several years in the future. A taxpayer
receives a greater benefit from current year deductions than future
deductions because he can either invest the funds made available by
the reduced tax bill or use them to meet immediate cash needs. For
example, if a hypothetical taxpayer can reduce his tax bill by
$100,000 each year by recovering his investment in purchased good-
will through depreciation over an assumed twenty year useful life
($2,000,000 in deductions over 20 years), he would be in a much
better position than under current law which requires him to wait
until the business is sold before recovering his investment. This is
87. "Basis" is the term used in the Code to refer, generally, to the cost of property.
I.R.C. § 1012 (1988). Under I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1988), a taxpayer's basis in property
is reduced as depreciation deductions are taken.
88. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1988) for the rules governing the calculation of gain or loss
on the disposition of property.
89. As explained supra note 40, "cost recovery" is a term often used to refer to tax
depreciation. Cost recovery also refers to the return of a taxpayer's investment in an
asset through depreciation deductions or a deductible loss or reduction in taxable gain on
the final disposition of the asset. See CmRELSTEIN, supra note 19, % 6.08, at 137.
true even though the taxpayer may realize a tax benefit of
$2,000,000 on the sale of the business. 90
Because of the effects on the purchaser's cash flow, the amount of
the purchase price of a business recoverable through depreciation de-
ductions may be a significant factor in determining the financial suc-
cess of a purchased business. 91 The effects are more pronounced for
a company such as a service business which relies primarily on intan-
gible, rather than tangible, assets in producing its income. The de-
nial of depreciation deductions to the purchaser of such a business
severely restricts the purchaser's after-tax cash flow.
92
B. Comparison to Financial Accounting Treatment
Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),93 the
cost of purchased intangibles in the nature of goodwill is required to
be amortized, using the straight line method, through charges
against income over the period of years estimated to be benefitted,
not to exceed forty years.94 Accounting Principles Board Opinion
Number 17 ("APB 17") lists several factors that a company must
consider in estimating the useful life of various intangible assets:
a. Legal, regulatory or contractual provisions may limit the maximum
useful life.
b. Provisions for renewal or extension may change a specified limit on use-
ful life.
90. If our hypothetical taxpayer can invest the $100,000 made available annually
by depreciation deductions at an assumed 8 % annual return, he will receive tax benefits
over a 20-year period with a present value of $981,815. If the taxpayer cannot depreciate
goodwill, however, and sells the business in 20 years, he will only receive a tax benefit
from his $2,000,000 basis in goodwill with a present value $429,096.
The denial of depreciation deductions in this example results in a penalty to the tax-
payer of $552,719. Of course, this example assumes that the taxpayer is subject to one
constant tax rate throughout the 20 year period. While this assumption is extremely
simplified, this example illustrates the detrimental effects of the nondepreciability of
goodwill.
91. Gregorcich, supra note 28, at 257.
92. Id.
93. The term, "Generally Accepted Accounting Principles," refers to the authori-
tative pronouncements of the accounting profession that determine the standards to be
used by companies in recording the economic effects of business transactions and in re-
porting these effects to outside parties, such as bankers and investors. This process is
referred to as "financial accounting." Currently, accounting standards are promulgated
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board. See WELSCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 3-
8.
94. INTANGIBLE AssmrS, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17, 11 27, 29,
30 (Accounting Principles Bd. 1970), reprinted in Original Pronouncements Vol. II, Ac-
counting Standards as of June 1, 1992, 227-28 [hereinafter APB 17]. Paragraph 27 of
APB 17 states that "the Board believes that the value of intangible assets at any one
date eventually disappears and that the . . . costs of intangible assets should be amor-
tized . . . over the periods estimated to be benefitted." APB 17, 27.
The Accounting Principles Board was the body responsible for promulgating account-
ing standards until the creation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 1973.
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c. Effects of obsolescence, demand, competition, and other economic fac-
tors may reduce a useful life.
d. A useful life may parallel the service life expectancies of individuals or
groups of employees.
e. Expected actions of competitors and others may restrict present com-
petitive advantages.
f. An apparently unlimited useful life may, in fact, be indefinite and bene-
fits cannot be reasonably projected.
g. An intangible asset may be a composite of many individual factors with
varying effective lives. 5
The required amortization of purchased goodwill for financial ac-
counting purposes is based on the principle that the net income of a
company is overstated unless all costs are deducted from related rev-
enues.96 Under this concept, goodwill is considered similar to most
other assets of a business. The costs in obtaining goodwill, therefore,
should be amortized in future years under a method that produces a
fair pattern of charges against income. The negotiations leading to
the purchase price of the acquired business may indicate the most
appropriate time period for amortization. Because the purchaser of a
business acquires goodwill with the expectation that the company
will generate excess earnings, in theory its cost should be amortized
over the anticipated future period of excess earnings.9 8 Additionally,
because many factors (seven of which are described in the preceding
paragraph) may cause the deterioration of purchased goodwill over
time, proving its continued existence at a future date is difficult. 9
The determination of net income for tax purposes corresponds
closely to the process of determining net income for financial ac-
counting purposes.100 In fact, the regulations indicate that GAAP
95. Id. 27.
96. GEORGE R. CATLErr & NORMAN 0. OLSON, ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL
80, Accounting Research Study No. 10 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1968).
97. Id. This view is similar to the financial accounting concepts underlying depre-
ciation of tangible assets. Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 1 1 56, reprinted in
WELSCH ET AL., supra note 34, at 481, defines depreciation as follows:
Depreciation accounting is a system of accounting which aims to distribute the
cost or other basic value of tangible capital assets, less salvage value (if any),
over the estimated useful life of the unit... in a systematic and rational man-
ner. It is a process of allocation, not of valuation. Depreciation for the year is
the portion of the total charge under such a system that is allocated to the
year.
98. CATLETT & OLSON, supra note 96, at 80. See discussion of excess earnings as
a basis for determining goodwill, supra notes 34, 75-76 and accompanying text.
99. CATLETr & OLSON, supra note 96, at 80. Under this view, any goodwill that
continues to exist must be new goodwill that is created since the acquisition of the busi-
ness. See supra text accompanying note 80 for additional discussion of this concept.
100. Harold Dubroff et al., Tax Accounting: The Relationship of Clear Reflection
of Income to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 47 ALB. L. REv. 354, 374
"will ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflecting income" for tax
purposes. °10 Moreover, the courts generally give favorable treatment
to the Service's reliance on GAAP as an accounting method that
clearly reflects income.0 2 The courts have held, however, that some
practices followed under GAAP are not acceptable for tax account-
ing purposes. 03
Despite the lack of complete conformity to financial accounting,
the Regulations and judicial interpretations make clear that tax ac-
counting is significantly influenced by GAAP. The rationale underly-
ing amortization of goodwill for financial accounting purposes (i.e.,
changes in the business environment leading to the deterioration of
the capacity to generate the excess earnings embodied in purchased
goodwill) should be recognized by the tax law.
C. Comparison to Sections 195 and 248
The amortization of start-up and organizational expenditures
under sections 195 and 248, respectively, provides further justifica-
tion for allowing depreciation of intangibles.104 Amortization of
(1983).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1987). The regulation states as
follows:
A method of accounting which reflects the consistent application of generally
accepted accounting principles in a particular trade or business in accordance
with accepted conditions or practices in that trade or business will ordinarily be
regarded as clearly reflecting income, provided all items of gross income and
expense are treated consistently from year to year.
102. Dubroff et al., supra note 100, at 391. See also, All-Steel Equip., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 467 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1972); Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357
F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1966). In both cases, the taxpayer's method of valuing inventory was
rejected by the court because the method was not an acceptable accounting practice for
GAAP purposes and did not clearly reflect income for income tax purposes.
103. See e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 540, 542
(1979). The taxpayer's write-down of excess inventory to its scrap value, while in accor-
dance with GAAP, was disallowed as a tax deduction because the merchandise was
neither defective nor offered for sale at its reduced value. The Court stated that the
Regulations "embody no presumption" that any accounting practice that conforms to
GAAP is valid for income tax purposes. The Court also stated, though, that in most
cases GAAP accounting practices are acceptable for tax purposes.
In Thor, the Court discussed the different goals of tax and financial accounting
(GAAP), i.e., GAAP is based on the concept of conservatism, which seeks to avoid over-
statement of net income in reporting to financial statement users, while the primary
objectives of the income tax system are the equitable collection of revenue and the pro-
tection of the public fisc. Id. at 542-43.
See also Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963). An accrual method taxpayer
was required to report amounts received in advance for dance lessons as gross income for
tax purposes in the year of receipt even though the taxpayer recognized income for
GAAP purposes as it was earned over the period of time during which the lessons were to
be given.
104. I.R.C. § 195(c)(1) (1988) defines a start-up expenditure as any amount-
(A) paid or incurred in connection with-
(i) investigating the creation or acquisition of an active trade or business, or
(ii) creating an active trade or business, . . . and
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start-up expenditures is allowed over a relatively short period (five
years) despite the creation of goodwill that will benefit the business
for an undetermined number of years. Because the five year amorti-
zation period is mandated by statute, the taxpayer is not required to
prove a limited useful life for the benefits provided by start-up ex-
penditures. In the case of purchased goodwill, however, the inability
of the taxpayer to reasonably estimate a useful life is the primary
obstacle to securing depreciation deductions.
10 5
The legislative history of section 195, as enacted in the Miscella-
neous Revenue Act of 1980, explained that investigatory costs eligi-
ble for amortization include expenses such as analysis or survey of
potential markets, products, labor supply, and transportation facili-
ties.106 Eligible start-up expenditures also include costs which are in-
curred after a decision has been made to establish a business, but
before the business actually begins.107 Examples of such start-up
costs include advertising, salaries and wages of employees while be-
ing trained, travel expenses associated with lining up distributors,
suppliers and customers, and executive salaries.108
In general, capitalization has been required of start-up expendi-
tures incurred prior to beginning a new business.10 9 The capitaliza-
tion requirement is also present under section 195.110 Before section
(B) which, if paid or incurred in connection with the operation of an existing
active trade or business (in the same field as the trade or business referred to in
subparagraph (A)), would be allowable as a deduction for the taxable year in
which paid or incurred.
I.R.C. § 248(b) (1988) defines an organizational expenditure as any expenditure
which-
(1) is incident to the creation of the corporation;
(2) is chargeable to capital account; and
(3) is of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of a corpora-
tion having a limited life, would be amortizable over such life.
Provided the taxpayer makes the proper election, both start-up and organizational ex-
penditures are amortizable over a five-year period beginning with the month in which the
taxpayer begins business.
105. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
106. H.R. REP. No. 1278, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980); S. REP. No. 1036, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 31 and 83 for examples of
similar expenditures (i.e., research and development and establishing a marketing struc-
ture) that are deductible in creating goodwill for an ongoing business. While such ex-
penses must be capitalized and amortized if incurred during the start-up phase of a
business, they are deductible currently if incurred by an ongoing enterprise in pursuit of
its existing business.
107. H.R. REP. No. 1278 at 10-11; S. REP. No. 1036 at 11-12.
108. Id.
109. GRAETZ, supra note 21, at 361.
110. I.R.C. § 195(a) (1988). Section 195(a) states, "Except as otherwise provided
in this section, no deduction shall be allowed for start-up expenditures."
195 was enacted, however, amortization of capitalized start-up costs
was ordinarily disallowed.111 By allowing amortization over a five-
year period, however, Congress sought to decrease the controversy
and litigation in this area of the tax law.
112
A primary theory underlying the capitalization requirement is that
start-up expenditures create an asset or produce a significant benefit
that extends beyond the current taxable year.11 3 Similarly, when a
taxpayer purchases an ongoing business he acquires assets (both tan-
gible and intangible) that will benefit the business in future years.
Start-up expenditures, such as advertising, training of employees,
and lining up customers, suppliers, and distributors may also create
intangible assets, including goodwill, that become part of the ongo-
ing enterprise once business begins. 1 4
Another Congressional objective in enacting section 195 was to fa-
cilitate economic growth by encouraging formation of new businesses
through the recovery of previously nonamortizable start-up expendi-
tures.115 Although disallowing depreciation of purchased intangibles
in the nature of goodwill does not discourage the formation of new
businesses, it does restrict, to a certain degree, the free transfer of
assets by reducing the price a seller is able to obtain on the sale of
his business.
When the parties negotiate the purchase and sale of a business, an
allocation of the purchase price is typically made in the purchase
agreement to the specific assets purchased based upon each asset's
fair market value.1 ' Because the buyer and seller have conflicting
tax interests, the purchaser will want a reduction in the purchase
111. BITTKER, supra note 16, 20.4.4. See also Richmond Television Corp. v.
United States, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965). The taxpayer was denied amortization of
job training expenses incurred before obtaining its operating license from the Federal
Communications Commission and before commencement of broadcasting because re-
newal of the license was almost certain and thus the start-up costs would benefit the
taxpayer for an indefinite period of time.
112. H.R. REP. No. 1278 at 10; S. REP. No. 1036 at 11. The controversies and
litigation involving start-up expenditures occurred when taxpayers were denied current
deductions or amortization. See, e.g., Central Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984) (taxpayer denied deductions for expenditures in investi-
gating and starting up new branches on the grounds that a "separate and distinct asset"
was created). See also Richmond Television, 354 F.2d 410 (taxpayer denied amortiza-
tion of start-up expenses).
113. GEORGE B. JAVARAS ET AL., START-UP EXPENSES % 105.02 (CCH Tax Trans-
actions Library 1992).
114. See supra text accompanying note 31 for examples of similar expenditures
that create goodwill in an ongoing business.
115. H.R. REP. No. 1278 at 10; S. REP. No. 1036 at 11.
116. Harold E. Abrams & Gregory K. Cinnamon, Purchase Price Allocations Re-
stricted by Tax Reform Act of 1986, 15 TAX'N FOR LAw. 210, 210 (1937).
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price if any part of the price is allocated to nondepreciable in-
tangibles such as goodwill or going concern value.117 Under the cur-
rent tax rate structure, however, the buyer versus seller conflict has
been diminished. Of course, if future tax law changes increase the
capital gains preference by a reduction in the capital gains rate or an
increase in the rates on ordinary income, the conflicting tax interests
of buyer and seller will again become a significant factor in negotiat-
ing the purchase and sale of a business. Under a tax law with a
larger capital gains preference, if goodwill were depreciable, the
buyer would be less reluctant to allocate a reasonable portion of the
purchase price to goodwill and the seller would be able to negotiate a
price for his business free of the artificial restrictions imposed by the
current rule of nondepreciability.
In addition to the amortization of start-up expenditures under sec-
tion 195, the Code also permits the amortization of another type
capital expenditure having an indeterminate life. Section 248 allows
five-year amortization of the organizational expenditures incurred in
the creation of a corporation.""' Amortization of organizational ex-
penditures is allowed despite the benefits provided to a corporation
117. See Gregorcich, supra note 28, at 257-58; CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19,
17.04, at 327. A buyer prefers allocation of the purchase price to assets that will give rise
to current or future tax deductions (e.g., depreciable tangible assets, the seller's covenant
not to compete, which may be depreciable over the life of the agreement, or inventory,
which gives rise to a deduction when sold to customers). The'buyer would prefer a zero
allocation to goodwill, if possible (although this is not likely in the sale of a going busi-
ness), because an allocation to goodwill will render that portion of the investment
nonrecoverable until the business is sold or terminated. The seller, on the other hand,
prefers allocation of as much of the purchase price as possible to goodwill, with as little
as possible going to inventory, depreciable tangible assets, covenant not to compete, and
other ordinary income items. The seller desires this type of allocation because he receives
capital gain treatment on the sale of goodwill, while he is taxed at ordinary income rates
on the sale of most other assets.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act substantially reduced the buyer versus seller conflict by
reducing the capital gains preference. Currently, individuals are taxed at a top marginal
rate of 31% on ordinary income (the top marginal rate for individuals will be increased
to 39.6% now that H.R. 2264 has been enacted), while the maximum capital gains rate
is 28%. Before the 1986 Act, the highest individual marginal rate was 50% while the
maximum capital gains rate was 20 %. See discussion in James P. Kleier, Avoiding "Ex-
cess Purchase Price by Careful Allocation to Intangibles 16 TAX'N FOR LAW. 186, 186
(1987).
Note that the latitude of buyers and sellers in allocating the purchase price has been
significantly restricted by § 1060, which requires that the allocation now be made in a
manner similar to that prescribed by I.R.C. § 338(b)(5) (1988). In other words, the
Service is now less likely to accept the parties' allocation at face value, even if the parties
have conflicting tax interests. See Abrams & Cinnamon, supra note 116, at 210.
118. See supra note 104 for the Code's definition of organizational expenditures.
throughout its entire life, which is unlimited in most instances.119
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE NONDEPRECIABILITY PROBLEM
As examined in previous sections of this Comment, the obstacle
preventing depreciability of goodwill has been the belief, as embod-
ied in the Treasury Regulations and court decisions, that goodwill
has an unlimited, or at least indeterminate, life.120 This section of
the Comment concerns analyzing possible solutions to the controver-
sies created by requiring taxpayers to estimate a useful life for good-
will-related intangibles and prove sufficient separateness from
goodwill itself in order to sustain depreciation deductions.
A. Statutory Life
Under this method, a fixed useful life would be established by
statute for goodwill and other related intangibles. 21 Statutory lives
are employed in many other areas of the Code, such as cost recovery
of tangible property under section 168 and the amortization of start-
up expenditures and organizational expenditures under sections 195
and 248, respectively. 22
The five-year amortization of start-up expenditures under section
195 was a compromise between immediate deduction or capitaliza-
tion without amortization.2 3 One of the objectives behind this com-
promise was simplification of the tax law through decreased
119. WEST'S FEDERAL TAXATION: CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, ESTATES AND
TRUSTS, 1981 ANNUAL EDITION 82 (1980).
120. See supra notes 46-49 and 77-79 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., the intangibles provision of H.R. 13, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993),
which was passed by the House as part of H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (see
discussion supra note 1). The H.R. 13 intangibles provision proposes that a taxpayer
would be entitled to depreciate purchased intangibles over a statutory life of fourteen
years. The following is a partial list of the intangibles that would be eligible for deprecia-
tion under proposed § 197(d): goodwill, going concern value, work force in place, pat-
ents, copyrights, customer-based intangibles (including deposit-based and similar items
acquired in the purchase of a financial institution), supplier-based intangibles, licenses,
covenants not to compete, and franchises. Proposed § 197(b) prescribes that, except for
depreciation over the statutory life, no depreciation deduction would be allowed for the
intangibles listed in § 197(d). Apparently, this restriction is intended to eliminate the
problems of proof and controversy that would arise if a taxpayer attempts to depreciate
an intangible (e.g., a customer list or noncompete covenant) over a lesser number of
years than the statutory life. Proposed § 197(c) excludes self-created intangibles from
the definition of depreciable intangibles. Therefore, expenditures incurred to create in-
tangibles will maintain their deductible status (e.g., advertising and research and devel-
opment) under the proposed law.
122. See supra notes 20-21, 40-41 and 104-19 and accompanying text.
123. John W. Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income:
A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of Basics, 6 VA. TAx REV.
1, 7 n.15 (1986). The author states that this compromise was based on a similar compro-
mise concerning amortization of organizational expenditures under § 248.
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controversy and litigation.124 Similarly, simplification is needed in
the area of amortization of intangibles. A statutory life should sig-
nificantly reduce the controversy and litigation that arises under the
current law when a taxpayer attempts to depreciate a customer list
or similar intangible that is closely related to goodwill."' 5 Before the
Supreme Court's decision in Newark Morning Ledger, depreciation
of these types of intangibles was often denied by the Service and the
courts on the grounds that they were inseparable from nondeprecia-
ble goodwill.1 26 The Newark decision could lead to an increasing
number of controversies between taxpayers and the Service. Courts
will no longer be able to routinely deny depreciation because Newark
held that customer-based intangibles are not nondepreciable as a
matter of law. 27 Thus, taxpayers will now be more inclined to de-
velop sophisticated factual proof to support their depreciation
deductions.12 a
In this era of mammoth federal budget deficits, changes to the tax
law must not reduce revenues. In drafting the intangibles provision
that was included in H.R. 13, Congress selected a fourteen year stat-
utory life so that the bill would be approximately revenue neutral
over the following five fiscal years.129 The revenue loss from depreci-
ation of currently nondepreciable intangibles was anticipated to be
124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
125. The intangibles provision of H.R. 13, if enacted under H.R. 2264, should
accomplish this objective because it mandates a statutory life for the types of intangibles
that have created controversy under the existing tax law, such as customer-based in-
tangibles, covenants not to compete, and consulting agreements. See also supra notes 12
and 121 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555 (3d
Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993) (discussed supra notes 46-47 and 61-62 and
accompanying text); Dodge Bros., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1941)
(discussed supra note 78).
Note that the question of depreciation of goodwill itself is almost never litigated be-
cause it has long been settled that goodwill is nondepreciable as a matter of law. See,
e.g., Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974) ("[T]his proposition is so well settled that the only
question litigated in recent years regarding this area of the law is whether a particular
asset is 'goodwill.' "); See also Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1986) ("No
deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.").
127. See related discussions supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
128. See related discussion supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
129. H.R. REP. No. 631, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1992); S. REP. No. 300, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1992). Congress recognized that the actual useful lives of certain
intangibles depreciable under current law may be shorter than 14 years, while the useful
lives of other intangibles may be longer than 14 years or indeterminate. Id. See also
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT TO H.R. 11 6 (Serial No. JCX-38-92) (Oct. 6, 1992).
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Newark Morning Ledger, concern existed
offset by the application of the bill to currently depreciable in-
tangibles with lives that are typically shorter than fourteen years.130
A statutory life system would be an effective method of solving the
problems of inequity, controversy, and complexity in the current tax
treatment of intangible assets.1 31 However, such a system can be
criticized on the ground that it does not recognize that different busi-
nesses face different levels of risk and that different elements may be
involved in creating goodwill. 13 2 Despite this criticism, a statutory
life for intangibles is desirable because of its expected simplicity and
effectiveness.
about the effect the decision would have on the revenue estimates for H.R. 11 or any
subsequent bill such as H.R. 13. The 14-year life proposed by H.R. 11, which was car-
ried over into H.R. 13, was designed to be revenue-neutral as compared to the then-
existing (i.e., before the Supreme Court's decision in Newark) law governing deprecia-
tion of customer-based intangibles. Before the Newark decision, one commentator hy-
pothesized that if the Supreme Court were to reverse the Third Circuit, the Service
would likely lose or concede more cases. Because the Newark Court held for the tax-
payer, the 14-year statutory life should actually result in increased tax revenues if the
revenue projections for the intangibles provision of H.R. 11 prove to be reasonably accu-
rate. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Newark Morning Ledger: A Threat to the Amor-
tizability of Acquired Intangibles, 55 TAX NOTES 981, 985 (1992).
130. H.R. REP. No. 631 at 210; S. REP. No. 300 at 23. See, e.g., Colorado Nat'l
Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771 (1990), aff'd, 984 F.2d 383
(10th Cir. 1993) (discussed supra note 61). The court sustained the taxpayer's deprecia-
tion deductions over periods ranging from 3 to 10 years of the core deposits intangible
acquired in the purchase of several banks. Under H.R. 13, core deposits intangible (re-
ferred to as deposit base in proposed § 197, see supra note 121) would be depreciated
over 14 years. Covenants not to compete, another significant currently depreciable intan-
gible which would be depreciable over 14 years under the intangibles provision of H.R.
13, typically are depreciated over lives of five years or less under current law.
131. The question of retroactivity becomes a concern when analyzing Congress'
stated objective to reduce controversy and litigation. Retroactivity would be desirable
from the standpoint of settling present and future controversies involving intangibles pur-
chased before the effective date of the bill. New York State Bar Association Tax Section,
supra note 64, at 960. The intangibles provision of H.R. 13, however, would apply only
to intangibles acquired after the date of enactment, unless the taxpayer made an election
to have the new law apply to property acquired after July 25, 1991.
The nonretroactivity of H.R. 13 is the better approach. Current law is well-settled on
certain issues. For example, goodwill is not depreciable as a matter of law, but covenants
not to compete generally are depreciable. Therefore, retroactivity would frustrate the
legitimate expectations of some taxpayers and give other taxpayers windfalls that were
neither bargained for nor expected. Id. Retroactivity was included in the intangibles pro-
vision of H.R. 4210, the tax bill that was vetoed in March 1992. The provision, however,
was deleted when H.R. 11 was drafted in June 1992.
132. Note, supra note 75, at 873. The different elements involved in creating good-
will in different businesses can be illustrated by comparing a service business that has a
minimal investment in plant and equipment and that will likely generate most of its
goodwill through the skills of the owner, management, or labor force to a manufacturer
that has a heavy investment in plant and capital equipment and generates a large portion
of its goodwill through the organization of buildings and equipment into an efficiently
run plant. See Gregorcich, supra note 28, at 256-57.
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B. Immediate Deduction of Purchased Goodwill
This method would allow immediate deduction of goodwill and
other intangibles in the nature of goodwill in the year of purchase. In
addition to having the virtue of simplicity, this method would elimi-
nate the different treatment of purchased goodwill versus internally
developed goodwill.1 33 Immediate deduction, however, is objectiona-
ble on two grounds. First, such a deduction would result in a serious
misstatement of taxable income in cases where the amount of the
deduction is significant.3 Second, such serious misstatements of in-
come would result in significant and unnecessary decreases in gov-
ernment revenue.
C. Depreciation Over Period of Projected Excess Earnings
Under this method, the taxpayer would be allowed to depreciate
goodwill and other intangibles in the nature of goodwill over the pe-
riod of years that excess earnings are expected to continue. This
method is supportable because parties negotiating the purchase and
sale of a business frequently determine its value by discounting pro-
jected future earnings to present value.135 Therefore, deduction of
the cost of generating the excess earnings (i.e., the purchase price of
goodwill) over the same future period appears reasonable.
This method, however, is deficient because it would allow taxpay-
ers to easily manipulate both the amount of the purchase price allo-
cated to goodwill and other intangibles in the nature of goodwill and
the period of projected excess earnings. With the minimal capital
133. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86 for a discussion of the inequities
that result from this disparate treatment.
134. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 556
(3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993). The taxpayer allocated $94 million of the
total tax basis of $328 million in the purchased business to goodwill, going concern value
and purchased subscribers. See also Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, 60 T.C.M. at 772, 776
(1990). The taxpayer acquired 7 banks for a total adjusted purchase price of $89 million.
Of that total, the taxpayer allocated $47 million to two intangible assets - core deposits
intangible and goodwill. Core deposits intangible is analogous to the purchased subscrib-
ers in Newark Morning Ledger.
If immediate deduction were allowed for the purchase of intangibles in the nature of
goodwill, the taxpayers in the abo 'e cases would have been entitled to deductions of $94
million and $47 million, respectively, in the years in which the businesses were pur-
chased. Given the obvious value of these intangibles in producing future income, immedi-
ate deduction would produce a gross distortion of income in the year of purchase, as well
future years, in violation of the "clear reflection of income" principle of I.R.C. § 446(b)
(1988).
135. See supra notes 34 and 75-76 and accompanying text for discussion of the
capitalization of earnings approach.
gains preference under current law, the parties do not have a strong
incentive to engage in arms-length bargaining regarding the alloca-
tion of purchase price to goodwill. 136
D. Guideline Lives
Guideline lives were introduced as a means of determining depre-
ciable lives for tangible assets in 1962.137 Under the Guideline Life
System, tangible assets were assigned to broad classes with each
class having a single Guideline life. For example, the "office furni-
ture and equipment" category had a Guideline Life of ten years and
included items such as desks and computers. 138 A single Guideline
Life was also given to broad industrial categories, such as assets used
in air transport, which, regardless of their nature, were grouped in a
single class with a Guideline Life of six years.1 39
A system similar to the Guideline Lives used for tangible assets
could be established for intangibles. The Service could develop de-
preciable lives for intangibles based on the type of asset involved, as
well as the kind of industry. 40 For example, depreciable lives could
be assigned to subscriber relationships acquired in the newspaper in-
dustry and core deposits in the banking industry, as well as the
residual acquired goodwill.
Such a system has an advantage over a statutory single life system
because it recognizes the different elements of goodwill, as well as
the different levels of risk inherent in different industries.141 If depre-
ciable lives, however, are different for different categories of in-
tangibles, controversy and litigation in this area will continue
because taxpayers and the Service would, in many cases, dispute the
proper classification of assets. Moreover, determining the proper
industry classification for a particular taxpayer would be difficult. 143
136. See supra note 117 for a discussion of the adversarial tax interests of buyer
and seller.
137. Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418. The Guideline Life system was abolished
for assets acquired after 1980 with the enactment of the Accelerated Cost Recovery Sys-
tem under I.R.C. § 168 (1988).
138. GRAETZ, supra note 21, at 394-95.
139. Id. at 395.
140. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 64, at 949.
141. Note, supra note 75, at 873.
142. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 64, at 949.
143. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Under the current tax law, goodwill is nondepreciable as a matter
of law and other intangibles in the nature of goodwill, such as cus-
tomer lists and customer structure, are frequently found to be nonde-
preciable by the courts on the grounds that they are inseparable
from goodwill and possess indeterminate useful lives. Two significant
problems have been created by this law: 1) the unfair treatment of
taxpayers who are prevented from recovering their investment in in-
tangible assets through depreciation deductions and 2) the extensive
controversy and litigation that has arisen when taxpayers have at-
tempted to depreciate certain intangibles.
The responsibility for developing a solution rests with Congress.
To reduce controversy and litigation, and thereby remove a signifi-
cant burden from the courts and the Service, the legislative solution
must result in rules that are fair and relatively easy to administer.
Equally important, tax revenues must not be decreased by any
change in this area of the law.
The intangibles provision of H.R. 13 satisfies the requirements of
administrative ease, fairness, and revenue neutrality. Such a system
should bring about a substantial reduction in the number of contro-
versies and their attendant litigation, while also improving the fair-
ness of the tax law.
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144. Controversy may still arise if the Service disputes the taxpayer's allocation of
purchase price between tangible assets and intangibles depreciable over the statutory pe-
riod, which, under H. R. 13 (14 years), is longer than the recovery period of most tangi-
ble assets. Incentive for the parties to litigate this type of case, however, is less because
the financial stake is smaller as compared to the situation under current law where dis-
putes arise over allocation to depreciable tangible or intangible assets versus nondeprecia-
ble intangibles.

